We associate an optimistic T U game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N \S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N \S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.
Introduction
In this paper we study minimum cost spanning tree problems (mcstp). Imagine that a group of agents, located at different geographical places, want some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. However, they do not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly.
There are many economic situations that can be modeled in this way. For instance, several towns may draw power from a common power plant, and hence have to share the cost of the distribution network (Dutta and Kar, 2004 ). Bergantiños and Lorenzo (2004) study a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes from their respective houses to a water supplier. Other examples include communication networks, such as telephone, Internet, or cable television.
The literature on mcstp starts by defining algorithms for constructing minimal cost spanning trees (mt). We can mention, for instance, the papers of Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957) .
Other important issue is how to allocate the cost associated with an mt among agents. Bird (1976) and Dutta and Kar (2004) introduce two rules based on Prim's algorithm. Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (1994) introduce the Equal Remaining Obligation rule (ERO) based on Kruskal's algorithm. ERO is called the P − value in Branzei et al (2004) . Bird (1976) associates with each mcstp a cooperative game with transferable utility (T U game). According to Bird, the worth of a coalition is the cost of connection, assuming that the rest of the agents are not present. Hence, this worth takes the classical "stand alone" interpretation. The worth of a coalition is simply the best they can do without other players' contribution.
In this paper, we associate with each mcstp a different T U game. We define the worth of a coalition as the cost of connection, assuming that the rest of the agents are already connected, and that connection is possible through them at no charge.
Both T U games compute the cost of connecting agents to the source. The former takes a pessimistic point of view because it assumes, given a coalition, that the rest of the agents are not connected. The latter takes an optimistic point of view because it assumes that the rest of the agents are already connected.
In general there is no relationship between the optimistic and the pessimistic T U game. However, it is possible to find a relationship in an interesting class of problems. An mcstp is irreducible if reducing the cost of any arc, the total cost of connection is also reduced. Given an mcstp, Bird (1976) defined the irreducible problem associated with it. We prove that, in irreducible problems, both T U games are dual (two T U games v, w are dual if v (S) + w (N \ S) is constant for all S).
We apply this result to study the important issue of cost sharing. A cost sharing rule allocates the cost associated with an mt between the agents.
An idea is to use a solution concept in the field of T U games and applying it in the mcstp. The core and the nucleolus of the pessimistic T U game are studied in Huberman (1981, 1984) . The Shapley value of the pessimistic T U game is studied in Kar (2002) . Bergantiños and VidalPuga (2005a) define the rule ϕ, of the mcstp C, as the Shapley value of the pessimistic T U game of the irreducible form associated with C. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005b) prove that ϕ coincides with ERO. Moreover, in irreducible problems, the rule presented by Bird (1976) coincides with ϕ.
We define two rules in mcstp using the optimistic T U game. The first rule is the Shapley value of the optimistic T U game. The second one is the Shapley value of the optimistic T U game associated with the irreducible problem.
We thus have four rules in mcstp based on the Shapley value. We prove that, in fact, the Shapley value of the optimistic T U game coincides with the Shapley value of the optimistic T U game associated with the irreducible form, and with the Shapley value of the pessimistic T U game associated with the irreducible form. The classical Shapley value (as defined by Kar (2002) ) differs from these three.
Finally, we present a new characterization of this rule using a property of equal contributions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce mcstp. In Section 3 we introduce the optimistic T U game and present the main result. In Section 4 we study the four Shapley values. In the Appendix we give the proof of some of the results.
The minimum cost spanning tree problem
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems.
Let N = {1, 2, ...} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite set N ⊂ N , let Π N be the set of all permutations over N. Given π ∈ Π N , let P re (i, π) denote the set of elements of N which come before i in the order given by π, i.e. P re (i, π) = {j ∈ N : π (j) < π (i)}. Given S ⊂ N, let π S denote the order induced by π among agents in S.
We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set N 0 = N ∪ {0}, where N ⊂ N is finite and 0 is a special node called the source.
Usually we take N = {1, ..., n}.
A cost matrix C = (c ij ) i,j∈N 0 on N represents the cost of direct link between any pair of nodes. We assume that c ij = c ji ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ N 0 and c ii = 0 for each i ∈ N 0 . Since c ij = c ji we work with undirected arcs, i.e. (i, j) = (j, i).
We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as
ij for all i, j ∈ N 0 . A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly an mcstp, is a pair (N 0 , C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ C N is the cost matrix.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), we define the mcstp induced by C for S ⊂ N as (S 0 , C).
A network g over N 0 is a subset of {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N 0 } . The elements of g are called arcs.
Given a network g and a pair of nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is a sequence of different arcs
A tree is a network such that for all i ∈ N there is a unique path from i to the source. If t is a tree, we usually write t = {(i 0 , i)} i∈N where i 0 represents the first agent in the unique path in t from i to 0.
Let G N denote the set of all networks over N 0 . Let G N 0 denote the set of all networks where every agent i ∈ N is connected to the source, i.e. there exists a path from i to 0 in the network.
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C) and g ∈ G N , we define the cost associated with g as c (N 0 , C, g) =
When there is no ambiguity, we write c (g) or c (C, g) instead of c (N 0 , C, g). A minimum cost spanning tree for (N 0 , C), briefly an mt, is a tree t over N 0 such that c (t) = min
It is well-known that an mt exists, even though it is not necessarily unique. Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), we denote the cost associated with any mt t in (N 0 , C) as m (N 0 , C).
Given an mcstp, Prim (1957) introduced an algorithm for solving the problem of connecting all agents to the source, such that the total cost of creating the network is minimal. The idea of this algorithm is quite simple: starting from the source, we construct a network by consecutively connecting agents with the lowest cost to agents already connected Formally, Prim's algorithm is defined as follows. We start with S 0 = {0} and g 0 = ∅. Stage p + 1: Assume we have defined S p ⊂ N 0 and g p ∈ G N . We now define S p+1 and g p+1 . Take an arc (j, i) with j ∈ S p and i ∈ N 0 \S p such that c ji = min
If there are several arcs (j, i) satisfying this condition, select any of them. Now,
This process is completed in n stages. We say that g n is a tree obtained via Prim's algorithm. Notice that this algorithm leads to a tree, but that this is not always unique.
One of the most important issues addressed in the literature about mcstp is how to divide the cost of connecting agents to the source between them. We now briefly introduce some of the rules studied in the literature.
A (cost allocation) rule is a function ψ such that
represents the cost allocated to agent i.
Notice that we implicitly assume that the agents build an mt. As far as we know, all the rules proposed in the literature make this assumption.
A game with transferable utility, briefly a T U game, is a pair (N, v) where
A quite standard approach for defining rules in some problems is using T U games. We first associate with each problem a T U game. We then compute a solution for T U games (Shapley value, core, ...) in the associated T U game. Thus, the rule in the original problem is defined as the solution applied to the T U game associated with the original problem. This approach was already applied in mcstp.
We define, in mcstp, the rule Sh 1 as the Shapley value of the associated T U game, i.e.
This rule was studied in Kar (2002) .
An mcstp (N 0 , C) is irreducible if reducing the cost of any arc, the cost of connecting all agents to the source (m (N 0 , C)) is also reduced. In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005a) we proved that (N 0 , C) is irreducible if and only if there exists an mt t in (N 0 , C) satisfying the following two conditions:
Given an mcstp (N 0 , C), Bird (1976) defined the irreducible form (N 0 , C * ) associated with (N 0 , C). We define the rule Sh 2 as the Shapley value of the T U game associated with the irreducible form, i.e.
In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005b) we proved that Sh 2 coincides with the ERO rule (Feltkamp et al. (1994) ).
The optimistic game
In many class of problems it is possible to associate two T U games to each problem in the class: a pessimistic game and an optimistic game. An example could be queuing problems, where a set of agents stands to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. Each agent has a constant per unit of time waiting cost. A queue has to be organized, but monetary compensations may be set up for those who have to wait. Maniquet (2003) defined the worth of a coalition S as the sum of its waiting cost in an efficient queue if they had the power to be served before agents in N\S. Maniquet is taking an optimistic approach. Chun (2006) defined the worth of a coalition S as the sum of its waiting cost in an efficient queue, assuming that members of S are served after the members of N\S. Chun is taking a pessimistic approach.
In this section, we associate an "optimistic" T U game
Given S ⊆ N, Bird (1976) defined the worth of coalition S, v C (S), as the minimal cost of connecting all agents of S to the source, assuming that agents in N\S are out. This is a pessimistic approach because agents in N\S also want to be connected to the source.
Alternatively, we can take an optimistic approach. We can define the worth of coalition S, v + C (S), as the minimal cost of connecting all agents of S to the source, assuming that the agents in N \ S are already connected to the source, and that the agents in S can connect to the source through them.
Given an mcstp
is the mcstp obtained from (N 0 , C) assuming that the agents in S have to be connected to the source, the agents in T are already connected to the source, and the agents in S can connect to the source through agents in T . Formally, c We now associate a T U game
Notice that given S ⊆ N, v
is the minimal cost of connecting all the agents of S to the source, assuming that agents of N \ S are already connected. We now compute v C and v
This example shows that v C and v + C could be different.
We say that two mcstp (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C 0 ) are tree-equivalent if there exists a tree t such that, firstly, t is an mt for both (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C 0 ) and secondly, c ij = c 0 ij for all (i, j) ∈ t. In Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005a) we proved that (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C * ) (its irreducible form) are tree-equivalent.
In the next theorem we give some results about v The next Proposition says that with this algorithm we compute the irreducible form and the optimistic game of an mcstp. Because of the definition of the algorithm, it is trivial to see that the agents in C connect to the source via t in the order (i 1 , ..., i n ) following Prim's algorithm.
We now prove that given p, q ∈ {1, ..., n} such that q < p, we have that c 
The Shapley value
In Section 2, we defined two rules for mcstp based on the Shapley value of the pessimistic game:
. We now introduce two rules based on the Shapley value of the optimistic game. For all mcstp (N 0 , C), we define
For Example 1, the four rules are
In this example Sh
We now prove that this is true in general.
Proof. Let (N 0 , C) be an mcstp. Recall that (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C * ) are tree-equivalent. According to Theorem 1(b), v
follows directly from self-duality of the Shapley value (see, e.g. Kalai and Samet (1987) ). ¥ Because of Theorem 2 we can define the rule ϕ as
We now present an axiomatic characterization of this rule. Myerson (1980) introduced the property of balanced contributions in T U games. The next property is inspired by Myerson's property.
We say that a rule ψ satisfies Equal Contributions (EC) if for all i, j ∈ N, i 6 = j,
EC says that the impact of the connection of agent j on agent's i cost is equal to the impact of the connection of agent i on agent's j cost.
The next theorem characterizes ϕ as the only rule satisfying EC. Proof. We first prove that ϕ satisfies EC. For all i ∈ N, we denote N −i = N \ {i} and N Myerson (1980) proved that the Shapley value satisfies
for all i, j ∈ N, i 6 = j. Take i, j ∈ N, i 6 = j. By Claim 1 of the proof of Theorem 1, v
, we obtain that ϕ satisfies EC.
We now prove uniqueness. Let ψ be a rule satisfying EC. We prove that ψ = ϕ by induction on |N |. If |N| = 1 the equality is trivial. Assume that ψ = ϕ when |N | ≤ α − 1. We prove that ψ = ϕ when |N| = α.
Given i, j ∈ N, for simplicity, we write
, and ψ
Thus,
Since ϕ also satisfies EC,
Under the induction hypothesis, for all i, j ∈ N, ψ
ET says that if only the cost between agents i and j changes, both agents must win (or lose) the same.
Kar (2002) We have two rules for mcstp based on the Shapley value of an associated T U game: Sh 1 and ϕ. Both rules are very different, as we can see in the examples. The rule Sh 1 is defined through the pessimistic T U game. The rule ϕ can be defined through the pessimistic T U game and both optimistic T U games.
One may wonder which is the fairest rule (Sh 1 or ϕ)? We strongly believe that ϕ is a more suitable rule in mcstp. See Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2005a) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
There exist many problems for which authors have proposed rules through both: optimistic T U games and pessimistic T U games. We conclude the section comparing mcstp with bankruptcy problems and queuing problems.
For bankruptcy problems the Shapley value of the pessimistic T U game and the Shapley value of the optimistic T U game coincide. See, for instance, Thomson (2003) . The reason is that both games are dual, like in irreducible mcstp.
For queuing problems the Shapley value of both games differ, like in mcstp. Maniquet (2003) studied the Shapley value of the optimistic game. He provided several axiomatic characterizations. Chun (2006) studied the Shapley value of the pessimistic game, which he called the reverse rule. He provided axiomatic characterizations of the reverse rule. These characterizations are obtained by replacing some properties in Maniquet's characterization by their "reverse".
Appendix
We prove Theorem 1.
(a) Assume, without loss of generality, that
is the tree associated with C satisfying (A1) and (A2). Let S = © i 1 , ..., i |S| ª , where i p−1 ≤ i p for all p = 2, ..., |S|.
For each p = 1, ..., |S| , we define:
there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select any of them. Construct
We clarify these definitions with an example. It is immediate that t 00 is a tree in (S 0 , C) and t * a tree in (N 0 , C). Since C is an irreducible matrix, if we take agents of S as the source, t 0 can be considered as a tree in
As C is an irreducible matrix, for each p = 1, ..., |S| , c
Hence, v
and let t 00 be an mt in (S 0 , C) . It is possible to find a tree t
is an mt in (N 0 , C) and (N 0 , C 0 ) such that c i 0 i = c 0 i 0 i for all i = 1, ..., n. For all i ∈ N, i 0 ∈ N 0 is the first node in the unique path from i to the source.
We proceed by induction on |N|. If |N| = 1 the result is trivial. Assume that the result holds when |N| ≤ α − 1. We now prove it when |N| = α.
In order to simplify the notation, for all i ∈ N we denote N −i = N \ {i}. We prove several claims. Claim 1. For all mcstp (N 0 , C), S ⊂ N, and all j ∈ N \ S,
Proof. Let i, k ∈ S be such that i 6 = 0 and k 6 = 0. Thus, Thus, g is given by 
Assume that, in Example 4, t 0 is given by Let S j denote the set of agents in N −j who are connected to the source in t 0 through agent j. We now define S j formally. For each i ∈ N −j , let
¢ª be the unique path in t 0 from the source to i. We define
is a tree in (N 0 , C) .
We clarify these definitions in Example 4. Assume that S 5 = {4, 6} . Let (i t−1 , i t ) = (3, 4) . Thus, A which is a contradiction because t * is an mt of (N 0 , C). ¥ It is not difficult to see that t j = t This finishes the proof of Theorem 1. ¥
